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## CHAPTER EIGHT

### CONTINGENCIES

#### 0800 REFERENCES

a. JOPS, Volumes I and IV (NOTAL). (Subject: Joint Operational Planning System) Provides a model operation-oriented public affairs plan and contingency considerations.

b. OPNAVINST 3440.16 (NOTAL). (Subject: The Navy and Marine Corps Disaster Preparedness Manual)

c. OPNAVINST 3100.6D (NOTAL). [Subject: Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-3) and Unit SITREP Procedures] Provides procedures for world-wide reporting of events and special incidents which may attract national or high-level Navy attention.

d. OPNAVINST 5530.14A (NOTAL). (Subject: Physical Security and Loss Prevention) Sets forth policy and procedural guidance for physical security measures to safeguard Navy personnel, property and material at Navy shore installations. Discusses training and security force composition requirements, protective fencing and lighting, threat conditions and threat types.

e. OPNAVINST 5510.1G. (Subject: Department of the Navy Information and Personnel Security Program Regulation) Basic policy on information security.

f. U. S. Navy Regulations, 1973. Gives commanding officers authority to confiscate film (video, etc.) suspected of containing classified material.

g. DoD Instruction 5100.52 of 10 MAR 81 (NOTAL). (Subject: Radiological Assistance in the event of an Accident Involving Radioactive Material) Basic DoD policy. Implemented by OPNAVINST 3440.15.

h. DoD Directive 5230.16 (NOTAL). (Subject: Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance) Basic Defense Department guidance on the prompt release of information to the public in the event of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons, radioactive components, nuclear capable systems or nuclear reactors under DoD control.

i. OPNAVINST 3440.15 (NOTAL). (Subject: Minimum Criteria and Standards for Navy and Marine Corps Nuclear Weapons Accident and Incident Response) Includes sample public information releases.

j. OPNAVINST 3070.1A (NOTAL). (Subject: Operations Security) Governing directive for Operations Security (OPSEC) in the U. S. Navy. Discusses military deception, planning secrecy and the concept of essential secrecy. Contains procedures for conducting an OPSEC survey and identifying essential elements of friendly information.

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k. OPNAVINST 8110.18A (NOTAL). (Subject: Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons Safety Program) Basic directive for nuclear weapons safety.

l. OPNAVINST 5090.1 (NOTAL). (Subject: Environmental and Natural Resources Protection Manual) Implementing directive for the Installation Restoration (IR) Program.

m. OPNAVINST 3850.4A. (Subject: Protection of DON Personnel Against Terrorist Acts) Forwards the Department of Defense Handbook 2000.12H of April 1983. Discusses the terrorist threat, U. S. policy and strategic considerations and elaborates on personal protective measures to thwart a terrorist attack. Contains guidelines for conduct of hostages.

n. OPNAVINST 3722.5E (NOTAL). (Subject: Identification and Security Control of Military Aircraft) Provides guidance on countering security threats to military or military contract aircraft.

o. OPNAVINST 5290.1 (NOTAL). [Subject: Management and Operation of Navy Audiovisual Activities] Provides comprehensive guidance for visual information management and operations within the Navy.

## 0801 INTRODUCTION

a. General. This chapter provides basic guidance to assist officers in command in meeting their public affairs responsibilities in a wide variety of contingencies--aircraft, missile, vehicular, nuclear, conventional munitions and toxic waste accidents and incidents, combat operations, terrorist threats and attacks and other crises. Detailed instructions cannot be provided to cover every possible contingency. There are, however, certain actions that are appropriate in most circumstances. These include planning, contingency response exercises, preparatory measures implemented before an emergency arises and public affairs actions prescribed during and subsequent to an emergency. Basic contingency response planning documents are references (a) and (b).

b. Public Affairs Goals in a Contingency Situation. The following are guidelines on which positive actions can be based to achieve the following public affairs goals in an emergency:

(1) Safeguard civilian and military personnel and protect classified information and material;

(2) Ensure civil authorities are provided prompt and correct information to enable them to make decisions concerning the protection of the public.

(3) Retain public confidence in the command, the service and the Department of Defense;

(4) Respect rights of Navy and Marine Corps personnel to privacy and protect their welfare and the dignity of next of kin;

(5) Honor the right of the public to be informed rapidly and accurately of Navy and Marine Corps accidents and incidents and the Services' response in emergencies and other contingencies.

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c. **Chapter Organization.** This chapter is organized into five sections:

- (1) Section A: general accident response (not involving nuclear weapons or components; toxic waste or terrorist threats and attacks).
- (2) Section B: nuclear weapons accidents and incidents.
- (3) Section C: incidents involving toxic waste.
- (4) Section D: terrorist threats and attacks.
- (5) Section E: combat/wartime public affairs.

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**SECTION A:****GENERAL ACCIDENT RESPONSE****0802 PREPARING FOR THE EMERGENCY**

**a. The Pivotal Role of Public Affairs.** In an accident, disaster or other emergency, the public affairs officer (PAO) and staff play a leading role by providing direct operational support to the commander. Through internal information, the PAO educates and informs command personnel about positive response to a wide variety of contingencies and the need to take an active, preventive role before disaster strikes, such as the reporting of unsafe conditions in the work place, suspicious activity near secure areas, etc. In the event of a crisis, the PAO may employ internal information systems (especially electronic media) to keep command personnel informed as crisis control proceeds and to share lessons learned. In a public information capacity, the PAO informs the public of the incident and the Service's action to control it, thus alleviating apprehension and strengthening public confidence.

**b. The Need for Planning.** There is risk of mishap in any activity. Some activities are more prone to certain natural disasters while others may be more susceptible to threats of civil unrest or terrorist activity. Regardless of the nature of the occurrence, proper response in an emergency demands mature judgement and appropriate action taken without hesitation. Part of a command's response in an emergency is communication with a concerned public. The public has a legitimate interest in an occurrence which leads to injury, death or extensive damage to government or private property. Therefore:

(1) The PAO will be a member of command panels, boards or teams concerned with command response in crises and emergencies;

(2) Public affairs will be an element for consideration in all emergency action planning; and

(3) Public affairs actions will be prescribed by all command emergency actions plans (e.g., an annex or chapter on public affairs will be included).

(4) The commanding officer or duty personnel will promptly notify the PAO when any incident, occurrence, situation or evolution arises that has potential for causing reaction on the part of the public or news media.

(5) Planning will proceed as per Article 0602 (Basic Public Affairs Planning) and pertinent directives of seniors in the chain of command.

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**0803 PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSESSMENT OF AND INITIAL RELEASE ON A DISASTER**

**a. General.** Accurate public affairs assessments are essential elements of a command's evaluation of and report on a crisis or emergency. Reference (c) requires that public affairs assessments be included in incident reports to higher authority. This Article provides guidance on making these assessments as well as formulating the initial and subsequent releases of information to the public on disasters and other emergencies. As discussed in Article 0303e(5) (Events of Intense Public Interest), the rapid release of accurate, factual information on an accident, incident, disaster or other emergency is clearly in the best interests of the naval service. Both speed and accuracy are vital. However, a release containing incorrect information may create panic when there is no basis for such a reaction. Conversely, an accurate release provided too late to inform the public of the need for preventive or precautionary measures is of little value. While most details are unavailable and a comprehensive picture is illusive in the early stages of a disaster, rapid initial release of basic facts conveys the service's concern for the community and sets a positive tone for public opinion throughout the ordeal. When passed to higher echelons of command, the initial release also alerts a larger public affairs network to prepare to render assistance to the command or activities involved.

**b. Types of Public Affairs Assessments.** Commands may modify or expand the public affairs assessments listed below to describe more precisely the local situation.

(1) No media embarked.

(2) Media embarked; press release follows.

(3) No media embarked; media interest expected upon return to port.

(4) No known press interest.

(5) Public concern anticipated. Proposed statement and contingency questions and answers to follow.

(6) Local media on scene. The following statement was made at (date/time): "Quote..."

**c. Delivery Goal for Initial Releases.** When informed of an accident or significant incident, the commanding officer or duty representative must notify the PAO immediately. In turn, the PAO may recall all or a portion of the staff necessary to prepare and disseminate information to local news media. The command initiates the release or forwards it to higher authority for release; the information is not held pending inquiry. The goal is one hour from the time the PAO is first notified of the accident and the time information is prepared for initial release. Within the next hour, the majority of local and other interested news media are informed. (Other interested media could include wire services, state radio networks, etc.). Times of delivery should be noted on the news release or on an attached sheet.

**d. Initial and Follow-up Releases.** The initial news release should provide as much information as available on the key points or elements enumerated in Article 0808g (The Initial Release). Subsequent news releases provide missing or updated information as it becomes available. Do not delay making an initial release

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until all information becomes available. News media can be updated later. For a checklist of specific items to include in an accident release, see Article 0808 (Release of Accident Information).

**e. Handling Media Representatives On-Scene.** If media representatives are aboard or nearby at the time of an accident or disaster, full cooperation should be extended them in covering the story consistent with safety, protection of classified information at the site and other pertinent requirements. See Articles 0805 (Protection of Classified Material) and 0809 (Control of Video and Photography at the Accident Site).



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**0804 BRIEFING LOCAL OFFICIALS ON EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**

**a. Policy.** At least once a year, major Navy and Marine Corps shore activities will inform local news media representatives, civil defense and law enforcement officials about standard handling of accidents and other emergencies and contingencies. [Commands can also employ this opportunity to orient new local correspondents on the Navy and Marine Corps, local media pool operations (if applicable), the command's role in the Maritime Strategy, etc.] For overseas bases, commands shall conform to the policies of the Unified or Specified Commander in the need for or desirability of a briefing on emergency procedures and on the matter of procedural details.

Exception: These requirements do not apply to accidents or incidents involving nuclear weapons, naval reactors, their support facilities, or radioactivity therefrom. Such areas are covered separately under reference (n) which calls for coordination with responsible state and local authorities on nuclear emergency preparedness matters during which the necessary facets of public affairs matters are covered.

**b. Briefing Requirements.** This briefing:

(1) Should include composite command briefing on disaster preparedness with presentations or discussions on overall base plans, security, applicable laws and regulations and public affairs ramifications;

(2) Should be structured to involve key command personnel presenting different aspects of activity disaster preparedness, including the commanding officer, operations officer, staff judge advocate, security officer and PAO;

(3) May be held as a large, single gathering on or off base or as several separate sessions (i.e., one for media, one for civil defense officials, etc.);

(4) Should provide local news media representatives perspective on what to expect from Navy and Marine Corps public affairs personnel during an emergency and the reasons for the procedures;

(5) Will explain procedures the Navy and Marine Corps will follow in safeguarding classified material exposed at an accident site outside military jurisdiction.

(6) Should serve to introduce the public affairs staff and provide the news media with points of contact and phone numbers during and after working hours.

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**0805 PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL**

**a. Accident on a Military Installation.** Whenever classified material is exposed at an accident site, the command shall remove it or otherwise protect classified material from view consistent with the need to preserve the integrity of a site for accident investigators. After rescue and damage control, the priorities are to protect classified material, preserve a site for investigation and meet the need of the public for information. If the material cannot be removed from the site (for the sake of investigators, for example), the command should then cover the material with opaque material or erect an opaque barrier around it to prevent unauthorized viewing. [Consult references (d) and (e) for additional requirements that may be required as a function of circumstance, such as the posting of one or more guards until the material can be stored securely.] Accordingly, opportunities to cover the accident scene will not normally be granted to news media until the classified material is removed, covered or otherwise secured.

**b. On-site Security Review.** In rare, extraordinary circumstances, reporters may have photographed or videotaped classified material. In most cases, commands will not have the personnel or compatible equipment to conduct an on-site security review to determine positively that classified material has been exposed on film, videotape, etc., and to do so in time to satisfy the needs of reporters on deadline. Material would have to be shipped to another activity for processing and security review, and this would entail delays unacceptable to most correspondents. Nevertheless, the officer in command must judge whether or not classified material has been exposed. If, based on the commander's judgment and the best information available, it is probable that classified material has been exposed, the officer in command should exercise his or her right [Article 0702 of reference (f)] to confiscate exposed video, film, etc., that contains or is suspected of containing classified material. The PAO should make clear to those reporters that the command has no wish to restrain news coverage and is interested only in retrieving any classified information which may have inadvertently been obtained. Once all classified information has been removed, confiscated news materials will be returned. When film is confiscated, provide reporters a new opportunity to photograph or videotape the accident area once classified material has been removed or otherwise secured.

(1) In such cases, commands will make a telephone report of the circumstances (including names of correspondents and their news agency) to CHINFO or DIRPA. This report should be followed-up by immediate precedence message using the reporting system of reference (c). The telephone report and message should be provided to other superiors in the chain for information.

(2) The PAO should then telephone or visit the superiors (i.e., station managers, editors, etc.) of news media representatives to explain the situation and request cooperation. The PAO should advise that publication or airing of classified information (or refusal to surrender it to the military authority) is a violation of Federal law, especially 18 USC 793(d), 793(e), 795 and 797.

(3) News media leadership should also be assured that the command's interest lies solely in protecting classified material and that all cleared material will be returned to the correspondent with minimal delay. The command may again offer another photographic or video opportunity at the accident scene.

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(4) If Seat-of-Government level review is required, the command should forward the material directly to CHINFO or DIRPA who will coordinate with CNO (OP-09N) or CMC (Code INTC) and other officials as appropriate.

(5) Personnel conducting security review, especially those on-site when such a capability exists, should understand that the intent is to determine the presence of classified material only and not a means to identify and remove critical, derogatory or embarrassing material.

**c. Accident outside Military Jurisdiction.** Preventing news media access to an accident site in order to prevent compromise of classified material is far more difficult in the civilian domain. The actions prescribed by paragraph a and b above pertain with the following exceptions:

(1) The military cannot restrain or prevent media from covering a newsworthy event in the public domain outside military jurisdiction unless martial law has been declared or a National Defense Zone has been established.

(2) Civil law enforcement officials should be contacted immediately upon learning of an accident in the civilian domain and informed if there is likelihood that classified material could be visible on the scene.

(3) If it is ascertained that classified material is visible, the command should request that law enforcement officials cover the material and cordon off the area or, preferably, allow military personnel to do so.

(4) The command should take all other actions prescribed by subparagraphs b(1) through b(5) above.

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**0806 ACTIONS PRIOR TO AN ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT**

a. **General.** Public affairs action before an emergency generally centers on planning, exercise of staffs in contingency plans and briefing of both command personnel and interested parties external to the command.

Exception: The requirement to brief "interest parties external to the command" indicated above does not apply to accidents or incidents involving nuclear weapons, naval reactors, their support facilities, or radioactivity therefrom. Such areas are covered separately under reference (g) which calls for coordination with responsible state and local authorities on nuclear emergency preparedness matters during which the necessary facets of public affairs matters are covered.

b. **Prescribed Actions.** Prior to an accident, incident or other contingency, Navy and Marine Corps commands shall:

(1) Include the PAO and staff in periodic exercises of the command crisis response force;

(2) Periodically require the establishment of a Command Information Bureau (CIB) during contingency exercises;

(3) Implement an effective Command Internal Information Plan which calls for emphasis on command safety and response to emergent situations (e.g., periodic articles in command newspaper, broadcast spot announcements, etc., calling for the reporting of unsafe conditions or practices, etc.);

(4) Ensure that the command PAO meets with counterpart spokespersons in other activities and agencies which would likely be involved in an accident or incident;

(5) Ensure that a briefing on Navy and Marine Corps procedures in an emergency occurs at prescribed intervals for local news media representatives, civil defense and law enforcement officials.

(6) Plan for contingencies in accordance with Article 0802b (The Need for Planning).

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**0807 ACTION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT**

**a. General.** Consistent with national security, Navy and Marine Corps commanders will give maximum cooperation to news representatives covering military accidents. Cooperation may be restricted, however, in circumstances involving nuclear weapons or biological or chemical warfare research. The policy for military accidents occurring ashore outside the U. S., its territories or possessions may be given in separate guidance based on treaties, intergovernmental agreements and the Country Plan. See also Article 0104b(2) (Combined, Allied and Overseas Channels).

**b. Prescribed Actions.** Immediately following an accident or incident, the Navy and Marine Corps:

- (1) Take action to minimize further injury and property damage;
- (2) Rescue survivors and treat the injured;
- (3) Report the incident or accident to higher authority;
- (4) Preserve the accident scene to assist investigators;
- (5) Protect classified information in accordance with Article 0805 (Protection of Classified Material);
- (6) Consult with civil authorities if activating public warning or evacuation plans may be appropriate;
- (7) Conform to the provisions of Article 0810 (Basic Policy on Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Incidents) if a nuclear weapon, component or radioactive material is involved;
- (8) Rapidly meet the need for public information about the accident or incident.

As soon as possible following the conclusion of the event, the PAO should develop a narrative summary of public affairs actions taken before and following the contingency as a training tool to critique the staff and share lessons learned. The summary should be shared with the PAO of the immediate superior in the chain and CHINFO or DIRPA as appropriate. Destroy the summary when no longer needed for historical purposes.

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**PUBLIC AFFAIRS HANDLING**  
**OF CONTINGENCIES**  
**GUIDANCE PAGES**

**G-0807 ACTIONS FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT**

a. **General.** Immediately following an accident or disaster, operational personnel are involved in containment and control-- survivor rescue and treatment, damage control, protection of classified information, etc.--while public affairs personnel are obtaining facts and authority to release information as well as considering the establishment of a Command Information Bureau (CIB). After releasing initial information on the accident the affairs staff members where accurate information can be rapidly gathered, coordinated and released.

b. **Emergency Stations.** In most accidents and all those involving weapons systems and serious aircraft accidents, public affairs personnel should be situated in as many of the following suggested locations as possible:

- (1) Command post or emergency crisis control center of the installation;
- (2) At or near the accident scene;
- (3) The public affairs office or Command Information Bureau (CIB).

Personnel should be assigned to such stations in the customary manner (e. g., through an up-to-date Watch, Quarter and Station Bill).

c. **Staff Action on Learning of an Accident.** The PAO should promulgate, through office notice or Standard Operating Procedure, that, at the first word of a major accident, personnel should proceed to the assignments made in the Watch, Quarter and Station Bill, then immediately establish communications with command post or emergency crisis control center. Regardless of the location of the accident, communications must be established rapidly between the public affairs representative at the scene of the accident and at the installation. This allow as public affairs staff members at the accident site and those at the installation to coordinate information release on a timely basis. Communications should also be established directly with the PAO of the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or the area coordinator. It should be emphasized to personnel that such assignments may change during the course of an emergency.

d. **Protracted Accident Situations.** In accidents or incidents likely to require public affairs support around the clock for several days, or one that is likely to exceed the capabilities of the cognizant command's public affairs staff, the PAO should:

- (1) Set up a 24-hour CIB.
- (2) Consider operating the CIB as a joint bureau if other federal, state and local agency spokespersons are on scene.

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(3) Notify switchboard operators and duty officers to direct news media queries and public inquiries to the CIB rather than the command post.

(4) Provide copies of official Navy/Marine Corps news releases to any state, local, municipal or federal agencies and other officials concurrent with their release to the public when possible.

(5) Anticipate public concerns, and issue timely news releases before such concerns distort public perceptions.

(6) Forward requests for additional personnel and material support to the PAO in the next higher echelon if necessary.

(7) Appoint a staff member to keep a running log of:

- (a) The time of the accident and a basic description of the occurrence;
- (b) Important developments;
- (c) Times news releases are issued;
- (d) Policy as it was passed to you and how and when you implemented it;
- (e) Copies of OPREP-3s and other pertinent messages;
- (f) Other important information.

(8) If holding news conferences, advise news media representatives in advance that there will be no speculation as to cause or causes of an accident, and official comment will be made only after the investigation is completed. Brief personnel who will appear before the media. The briefing should begin with a review of the command press releases that have been issued, particular areas of interest on the part of the news media and other related issues of concern. Briefing points can include the following :

(a) "Reporters are eager to get as many details about the occurrence as possible. You're a source of information about either the incident or the people involved. Discuss only those matters with which you are personally familiar and are under your cognizance or authority. Do not discuss hearsay or speculation."

(b) "The decision to be interviewed or to participate in a press conference is entirely your own. There are excellent reasons, however, for being interviewed--such as placing the incident in proper perspective, mentioning acts of heroism, and so on."

(c) "Do not speculate and do not answer 'what if...' questions."

(d) "Do not repeat stories of which you are unsure."

(e) "Avoid any mention of classified information, including (insert applicable warnings, such as nature of a classified mission the aircraft was on at time of crash, etc.)."

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(f) "Do not speculate as to the cause of the accident or incident. Advise the correspondents that the cause will be investigated, and speculation may adversely affect the conduct of the investigation."

(g) "If you feel critical of someone's actions which you believe may have led to the accident or hampered our actions following the accident, avoid disclosing this to the news media. First, you may not know the details of the individual's action or the motivation involved. Also, discussing this openly may hamper the conduct of the official investigation."

(h) "As the Public Affairs Officer, I will make a comment if I feel during the interview or conference that you are getting into trouble."

**e. Family Support.** Concurrent with actions taken to obtain facts and release information publicly in a crisis, the PAO should ensure a timely and accurate internal information flow to dependents and assist them in dealing with the intrusions into their privacy by the news media. Whenever possible, the PAO must coordinate with the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) before releasing information on military personnel who have been injured or killed. Typically, major accidents or incidents will stimulate intense media interest. Because families are often more accessible to the media than are Navy personnel (who may be deployed), the family member may be besieged by aggressive reporters who seek interviews by telephone and in person at the dependent's home, work or elsewhere. In particular, local reporters are under intense pressure to obtain a local angle to a national or international story. The competition between national media also is usually very fierce, often with the dependent as the "prize." When dependents learn news of their loved ones from the media before they find out from official sources, they can feel upset and left out. When they feel the Navy is not supporting them they may speak to the news media to stimulate action or simply out of frustration or ignorance of the consequences. Often dependents do not understand they have the right not to be interviewed and that when they speak to the news media, they open themselves up to future interviews from competing media. Without experience in communicating through the media, dependents can become frustrated with the distortions and inaccuracies that appear in print and video. The PAO should do the following:

(A)

(1) **Advance planning.** Before any crisis, the PAO should have met with all family groups to ensure they understand the unit's organization and the ways they can obtain information in a crisis. Such methods should include a "phone tree" and contacts with the unit's ombudsman. The ombudsman network should include the sponsor's unit, Family Services Center, the unit's type command and the local PAO. Also, some units have answering machines which the PAO can use to disseminate timely and accurate information. Most importantly, the PAO must communicate the realities of dealing with news media. The PAO must make clear to dependents that public affairs assistance is available. Dependents must know where to call for help before the crisis.

(2) **Networking during the crisis.** During the crisis the PAO should feed accurate information through the chain of command to the families as quickly as possible, using the entire crisis communications network, which includes ombudsmen, CACO, unit, type command and the Family Service Center. It is a race to inform the families before the media does. In a crisis, the media may report highly inaccurate information. It is better that the families learn through their telephone network or even in specially called meetings. The PAO may also use the external media to inform dependents. In some cases a special information "hotline" can be

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established at the command information bureau or Family Service Center, with their phone numbers reported by the media. Where only a few people are involved or when the commanding officer's family is bearing the brunt of media attention, the PAO should provide an answering machine to screen calls. In some cases, it may be necessary to provide on-site assistance to family members determined to speak to media. In such situations, the PAO should ensure the dependents are briefed.

(a) **Geographic Dispersal.** When establishing and exercising the communications network, remember that even married members may have primary next of kin not always located at the unit's homeport or base. Some return home to live with parents during deployments or live near another military installation. In the case of single members, parents are the primary next of kin and are not likely to be located near the installation, where they would have easy access to regular sources of crisis information.

(3) **Command ombudsmen.** Ombudsmen fill crucial roles in crisis situations. They have the same rights of privacy as other Navy family members but sometimes choose, or are singled out, to become spokesmen in dealing with media. They will often have privileged or personal information concerning the command, its members and spouses. They must realize that in talking to media, they may encounter a conflict with their internal communication role. They must ask themselves, "Is talking to the news media in the best interest of themselves and the Navy families?"

(4) **Navy Family Rights in Dealing with News Media.** The Navy's policy is to protect members' and families' privacy, especially in times of crisis. In support of that policy, the following points should be made to Navy family members:

(a) **A Navy family member has a right to remain silent and may say "no" to a news media interview request.** When you grant an interview request, you have given up right to privacy and may be harassed by other reporters or the general public.

(b) **It is your individual decision whether to talk to the media or not.** If you decide to talk to a reporter, you should be careful of what you say. It is acceptable to discuss personal experiences (emotions, reactions, etc.) but you should not discuss command policy, hypothetical situations or speculate on what could have happened. Avoid repeating stories or rumors when you don't have direct knowledge of personal involvement. Second- and third-hand stories get more distorted each time they are repeated. Avoid Monday morning quarterbacking or offering an opinion on how you think things could have been done differently.

(c) **Internal privileged command information** such as the ship or squadron schedule or future operations is provided to crew members for personal family planning. It is privileged information and not for public discussion or release to news media by crew or family.

(d) **You have the right to privacy and you don't have to be subjected to harassment.** Navy PAOs will assist you but there will be some limit to the amount of assistance available off-base since reporters will be free to contact you in the civilian community. It is always appropriate to refer media inquiries to the PAO.

(e) **Some families prefer to be with other families and friends, away from their regular homes and telephones.** If you choose to stay away, you might want to have a friend by your home phone to receive official messages and information.

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(f) Newsmen have been known to follow personnel involved in dependent, family counseling and casualty notification processes in order to identify dependents and families.

(g) Once you talk to the media and are publicly identified, it is likely that other media organizations will attempt to contact you.

(h) Navy Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) are trained to deal with the news media and, if asked, will provide advice to Navy family members contacted by news media.

(i) If you decide to talk to the media, you may want to get the reporter to agree **before the interview** not to use your last name or address or to give out names and addresses of others in your command for security and privacy reasons. The PAO will assist you with ground rules if you decide to talk to a reporter.

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**0808 RELEASE OF ACCIDENT INFORMATION**

**a. General.** It is extremely important that information be released to the public as soon as possible after an accident. Such action underscores the concern of the Navy and Marine Corps for the public and the commitment of the Sea Services to the public's right to know. More importantly, the rapid release of information prevents or dispels rumors that could easily cause public alarm or promote misinformation in news media reports.

**b. Information on Persons Involved in Accidents.** Whenever possible, the PAO must coordinate with the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) before releasing information on military personnel who have been injured or killed in accidents. When communication cannot be established between PAO and CACO, such as the case of a deployed ship, the PAO must rely on messages. There are several key considerations in releasing such information which pertain equally to civilian personnel involved in accidents.

(1) Information must not be released to news media until confirmation is received that next of kin have been notified. Thereafter, information released to media must agree with that provided next of kin.

(2) After medical care for the injured, the rights and dignity of the persons involved in accidents and their next of kin are of paramount importance. However, the public's right to know takes on new importance in accidents, incidents and other disasters. Releasing the names of accident victims can relieve the anxiety and concern of relatives and friends of those not injured. Early and continuous liaison with the CACO will enable the command to release names as soon as possible after the accident.

(3) If an accident occurs off DoD property and military personnel are involved, news persons on the scene may be able to obtain identification without consulting the Service involved. Nevertheless, humanitarian considerations dictate that next of kin be notified of the situation before learning of it from news reports. If it is apparent that reporters know the identity of military accident victims and next of kin have not been notified, the PAO should make a professional appeal to the reporters requesting they voluntarily withhold names of persons involved on humanitarian grounds pending notification of next of kin. The PAO will inform the CACO of the results of this appeal and the personnel whose names are likely to be known by the reporters. A reporter declining to withhold names cannot be restrained, but the command may:

(a) Telephone or visit the reporter's supervisor (editor, station manager) and make another appeal on humanitarian grounds;

(b) Write a letter from the commanding officer to the editor or station manager with full details of the incident, with copy provided to CHINFO or DIRPA.

**c. Accidents Involving Key Officials.** Because of the potential of national and international implications, the release of casualty information on key U. S. and foreign government personnel and important foreign visitors must be carefully coordinated. Casualty information on key personnel who have been killed, injured or listed as missing while aboard a Navy or Marine Corps installation or being transported by a ship, vehicle or aircraft must be referred to the appropriate office for

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release. See subparagraphs (1) through (3) below. The unit PAO will establish immediate contact with that office and offer assistance as necessary, ensuring that all concerned, up and down the chain of command, are kept informed.

(1) The White House Press Secretary has sole release authority for news about the President, Vice President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Members of the Cabinet and foreign visitors of political or royal rank equivalent to these U. S. Government officials. The White House Press Secretary also releases information pertaining to members of foreign governments and chiefs of foreign military services below the rank equivalent to those U. S. government officials listed above when they are guests of the United States.

(2) ASD(PA) has sole release authority for news on U. S. Senators; U. S. Representatives; Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief of Naval Operations; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.

(3) The command concerned will release information and respond to queries on accidents involving other high-ranking military or civilian personnel: admirals, generals, officers selected for flag or general rank and civilians of comparable status. When commands release such information, they should inform CHINFO or DIRPA, preferably in advance of releasing such information and advise seniors in the chain of command.

**d. Multi-Service Accident Information Release Policy.** The following ground rules pertain to accidents that involve vessels, aircraft, missiles, vehicles, facilities, personnel casualties and search and rescue operations involving more than one Service.

(1) In joint exercises and operations, the joint command PAO is responsible for all public affairs actions. Exercise and operational public affairs guidance, operation orders (OPORDs) and other contingency plans customarily specify the procedures for accident information coordination and release.

(2) In all other cases, if circumstances permit, the parent Service of the affected aircraft, vessel or vehicle should make the initial public release. If not possible due to location or time constraints, components of any other Service may assist news media with both initial release and response to query, keeping the affected command and its parent Service informed. Once the affected Service releases information and responds to query, the other Services may release a full description of their own participation (e.g., search and rescue operations, etc.).

(3) Release of casualty information will conform to the particular Service's policies and regulations. Names and numbers of casualties can only be released by the Service to which the casualties belong. When time does not permit, and facts are obvious to the public, any other Service involved in the operation may, when queried, release numbers only (that is, number killed, number injured and number surviving).

(4) When possible, the names of casualties of all Services should be released simultaneously.



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For further guidance, consult Article 0512 (Information on the Injured, Wounded and Hospitalized) and Article 0513 (Electronic and Photographic Media Coverage of Injured Personnel).

**e. Accidents Outside the United States.** When instructions or plans of a Unified or Specified Command conflict with these instructions, the Unified Command plan takes precedence. Accidents occurring outside the United States may require additional coordination with the U. S. Embassy or Consulate to ensure proper notification of the host government.

**f. Release Procedures.** When informed of an accident or significant incident, the commander, commanding officer or duty representative immediately notifies the PAO. In turn, the PAO recalls the necessary staff to disseminate information to local news media. The command initiates the release or forwards it to higher authority for release; the information is not held pending inquiry. The goal is one hour from the time the PAO is first notified of the accident and the time the information is prepared for release. Within the next hour, the majority of local and other interested news media are informed. (Other interested media could include wire services, state radio networks, etc.).

**g. The Initial Release.** The initial release of information will contain as much of the information delineated below as possible. Do not delay making an initial release until more information becomes available. News media can be updated later.

(1) Type of accident.

(2) Location and time of accident.

(3) Persons involved. Initially, release number injured and killed, number of military personnel, civilian employees and civilians. Following confirmation that next of kin has been notified, release names of persons injured and killed. At all times, ensure that no information is released which invades the privacy rights of surviving service members, their dependents and next of kin (where applicable); see Article 0512 (Information on the Injured, Wounded and Hospitalized).

(4) Place of departure and destination. This pertains to vehicles, vessels, aircraft, missiles, etc., and should be released if unclassified.

(5) Type of equipment or system involved. This information will be withheld if the type of aircraft or missile is a developmental or experimental type that has not been previously announced or if it was on a classified mission. In such cases, a general description will suffice: "A Navy air-to-air missile..."

(6) Unclassified, pertinent facts about the mission at the time of the accident. Describe the purpose of the exercise or operation when the accident occurred ("The two ships were steaming side by side and conducting underway replenishment and refueling operations when the collision occurred") rather than non-descriptive phrases ("The two ships were conducting routine operations for training when the collision occurred"). The precise nature of certain missions may not be releasable until the official investigation has been completed and is released; consult the officer in command who will conduct the investigation for clearance of facts about the mission.

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**(7) Investigation.** Never speculate about the cause or contributing causes of an accident or responsibility for the mishap. The customary statement is "An investigation is being conducted to determine the cause of the accident." (If the mission was classified, so state; the destination of classified missions is not usually releasable.)

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**G-0808 HANDLING NEWS MEDIA AT THE ACCIDENT SCENE**

a. **Defining the Area.** Upon arrival at the accident scene, the senior military official should request either military police or other law enforcement authorities to rope off the entire area to protect the public from injury, government property from further disturbance and classified information from compromise.

b. **Briefing Reporters.** The command should prepare contingency questions and answers to respond to likely news media inquiries at the accident scene. Once statements or contingency answers are approved, the senior public affairs official at the scene should be granted permission to release the pre-approved information. See Article 0303e (7) (Delegation of Release Authority). In addition, reporters should be briefed on safety hazards and the need to preserve the site for investigators before they are permitted to enter the cordoned area. The briefing should be done by the public affairs official at the scene who can get information from others present. If a reporter refuses to cooperate, follow the instructions given in Article 0805 (Protection of Classified Material) and 0809 (Control of Video and Photography at Accident Sites). Keep in mind that a Navy or Marine Corps member may not physically restrict the movement of the news media at accident sites except on DoD property or in the civilian domain when martial law has been imposed or a National Defense Area established.

c. **Admitting reporters to the Area.** After the area is cordoned off and once news media representatives are briefed, the senior military official or senior public affairs official on the scene may grant permission to enter the accident area. The senior public affairs official at the scene is kept informed by communicating with the Command Information Bureau (CIB), public affairs office, emergency crisis control center or command post and also keeps the CIB informed of media activities at the scene. See Article G-0807b (Emergency Stations). Lack of escorts is not grounds for denying media access at accident sites off base. If classified information is exposed, the public affairs official or the OSC should explain the situation and ask reporters to stay back until the material can be covered or removed. See also Article 0809 (Control of Video and Photography at Accident Sites).

d. **Media Identification.** As part of the public affairs office's contingency planning, special news media identification badges should be kept on hand. These may consist of inexpensive plastic badges, arm bands or other similar devices that conform to the command's security badging system and are ready for immediate issue in the event of an accident or other emergency. Badges can be prepared in advance, with one or more badges marked and set aside for each local newspaper, several for each television station, etc. The badges can be taken to the accident scene by the public affairs office member assigned that station by the public affairs office Watch, Quarter and Station Bill; see Article G-0807b (Emergency Stations). Wearing the badge signifies to base security and law enforcement personnel that the wearer has been briefed on safety considerations regarding the accident site and the need to preserve the site for investigators. This briefing may have been presented at the annual briefing held by shore activities for local officials. See Article 0804 (Briefing Local Officials on Emergency Procedures). More importantly, the badge system can ease confusion at a busy, crowded site. Wearing such identification by reporters is voluntary in areas outside military installations but can be required of them on base.

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**0809 CONTROL OF VIDEO AND PHOTOGRAPHY AT ACCIDENT SITES**

**a. On U. S. Military Installations.** If no classified material is exposed, the commander may permit bona fide news photographers and electronic news gathering teams on the site to cover the event. A public affairs escort will be provided to ensure the news media do not interfere with official activities, such as accident investigations, search and rescue, etc. Escorts must be briefed on approved statements and command-approved answers to likely questions. See Articles 0306i (Response to Query) and G-0306j (Special Situations and Contingency Response to Query). They must also have the authority to release information to news media; review Article 0303e(7) (Delegation of Release Authority). If classified information is exposed and cannot be covered or removed, the command will prevent the press from photographing it. Not only must classified material be controlled during these and other public affairs activities, but also unclassified sensitive military technology and other information which is subject to protection under references (e), (h), (i) and (j). The commander will:

- (1) Notify the news media of the situation;
- (2) Bar photographers from the site;
- (3) Take custody of any exposed film or video and promptly conduct a security review.

If a news media representative has exposed film or video and it is confiscated, the command will provide the photographer a receipt for any items taken. The command must not detain the photographer because of the exposed film or video. After the film or video is reviewed and all classified portions are removed, the edited film or video should be returned to the photographer. Film or video with information that is believed to be classified, sensitive and relating to Exhibit 12A systems discussed in Chapter Five (Security and Policy Review) shall be forwarded for Seat of Government level review by the Assistant for Naval Investigative Matters and Security (OP-09N) or CMC (Code INTC--Counter-intelligence). Film should also be forwarded to OP-09N or Code INTC if the command is unable to process the film or conduct the security review itself. Any case of confiscation of film or videotape from a news media representative shall also be reported rapidly via the chain to CHINFO or DIRPA and the chain of command, preferably by telephone with message follow-up using the reporting system prescribed by reference (c).

**b. Off-Base in the U. S. or its Territories.** The authority of naval officials is limited in dealing with news media at the scene of an accident outside military jurisdiction. The senior Navy or Marine Corps official at the scene must determine whether there is any classified information present. If no classified information is exposed, or if it has been removed or covered, the senior Navy or Marine Corps official should assist news media in covering the scene. If it cannot be determined whether classified information is exposed, the senior official should explain concerns to the news media and advise them that photography cannot be authorized until a preliminary investigation of the scene confirms that no classified material is visible. This preliminary investigation should be accomplished thoroughly yet quickly to avoid undue delays to news media. If classified material is discovered and would be visible to media, explain to reporters that coverage can proceed without delay once the material is covered or removed. If at all possible, delays should be momentary. If reporters persist and do not agree to wait until material is secured, warn them that taking pictures of the scene without permission may violate federal law. Notify local

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law enforcement officials and request assistance, but do not physically restrain photographers or video operators. If classified information or material is, in fact, exposed and cannot be removed or covered, the senior Navy or Marine Corps official will:

- (1) Explain the situation and request that the news media cooperate;
- (2) Explain that federal law prohibits photography when official permission is expressly withheld (18 USC 795 and 797);
- (3) Request the assistance of civil law enforcement officials to cover exposed classified material from view;
- (4) Immediately contact the managing editor or station manager employing the camera operator and explain the situation;
- (5) Request the return of the suspect film;
- (6) Explain that publication, transmission or communication of classified material, or failure to return the material to military authorities, violate 10 U. S. C., Section 793(e).
- (7) Rapidly process, develop and review the film or tape or make arrangements with higher authority for its processing and review, advising CHINFO, DIRPA and the chain of command;
- (8) Return the unclassified portion to the photographer without delay.

c. Off Base in a Foreign Country. Navy and Marine Corps officials at the scene must conform to the requirements of any status of forces agreements, the laws of the host nation and the instructions of the Unified and Specified Command for that area.

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**SECTION B:****NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS****0810 BASIC POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS**

a. **General.** A nuclear weapons accident or incident will stimulate overwhelming and prolonged public concern and intense press interest. Senior military and civilian officials will also be involved, and many will visit the site and question on-scene personnel. The PAO and staff of the ship or installation at which the accident or incident occurred and the PAO and staff of the appropriate superior in the chain designated as on-scene commander (OSC) will be involved in accommodating the needs of a concerned public and the inquiries of numerous correspondents and high-ranking visitors.

b. **Policy Guidance.** Basic policy on public affairs handling of nuclear weapons accidents and incidents is contained in references (c), (h), (i), (k) and the directives of fleet, force and naval base commanders. These directives form the basis for nuclear weapon accident and incident response by Navy and Marine Corps activities. Reference (i) contains a standard checklist for public affairs actions following an accident involving radioactive materials. General guidance is provided below:

(1) In the United States, its territories and possessions, ASD(PA) retains initial public affairs responsibility for nuclear weapons accidents and incidents. In overseas areas, the appropriate Unified Commander retains initial public affairs responsibility (except for cases of weapon loss, theft or seizure) in coordination with ASD(PA) when time permits.

(2) As per reference (h), the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapons components at any specific location may be confirmed or denied only when official confirmation is in the best interest of public safety or as a means of reducing or preventing widespread public alarm. With the exception of weapon or component theft, seizure or loss, this official confirmation can be made as discussed below.

(a) Only the National Military Command Center's Director of Duty Operations can confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons or components in advance of the arrival on-scene by the OSC, in view of available information and in consultation with CNO or CMC.

(b) The OSC can confirm the presence of weapons or weapon components when that officer determines that confirmation is in the best interest of public safety in the United States, its territories or possessions. When applying this exception to policy, public authorities must be notified in a timely, candid manner, particularly in cases where protective action or evacuation of civilians must take place. Notification of local authorities does not preclude the OSC from issuing a release to local media warning citizens to take shelter.

(c) The OSC may issue a statement to the public that confirms or denies nuclear weapon or component presence in order to reduce or prevent

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widespread public alarm by assuring the public that injury from high explosives or potential exposure to radiation is remote. Such confirmation may also state that Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams are being deployed and DOD personnel are being evacuated from an installation to limit the number of personnel at an accident site to those with technical expertise.

(d) A Unified Commander, with the concurrence of the appropriate Chief of Mission when time permits, may confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons or components in overseas areas of foreign sovereignty. When confirmation or denial of weapon or component presence is required to allay public alarm or protect the public from a potential explosive or radiological hazard, the Unified Commander will coordinate the release of information with the host government. In all cases, civil authorities of foreign governments shall be informed when international agreements require such confirmation or notification.

(3) Confirmation shall be made promptly when actions in the interest of public safety must be taken, particularly when protective action or evacuation of civilians may be required. These actions may include release of statements to the news media to expedite the implementation of safety procedures. Contingency news releases are provided in references (h) and (i).

(4) The OSC or designated representative is authorized to consult ASD(PA) to obtain initial public affairs policy guidance or request an exception to policy.



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## SECTION C:

## HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE CLEANUPS

(R)

## 0811 INTRODUCTION

**a. History.** The military services use and produce large quantities of hazardous materials and waste products. Lack of stringent legislation in the past led to the use of expedient disposal methods that now threaten human health and the overall quality of the environment. Past hazardous waste disposal relied on burial. Although acceptable at the time, that method over the long term has led to the spread of contaminants largely through release in soil and ground water. The process, called migration, has resulted in wastes moving from the land area in which they were originally deposited into other public and private lands. Installation Restoration (IR) is the DoN program for identifying and cleaning hazardous waste sites.

**b. Basic IR Phases.** The IR program, governed by reference (1), consists of three basic phases of action. Two involve the identification of waste sites and an evaluation of their environmental impact, and the third deals with corrective measures.

**(1) Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) Study.** The PA/SI, formerly called initial assessment studies within the Navy, involve a record review, both at the activity itself and elsewhere, and an on-site examination of the activity's waste disposal history and identification of any potential pollutant problems. (R)

**(2) Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS).** The RI/FS, formerly called the confirmation studies within the Navy, consists of on-site, physical or analytical testing or monitoring of suspected pollutants at a site. The RI/FS will usually include soil and ground water sampling and analysis. A study of remedial alternatives is also done as part of the RI/FS.

**(3) Remedial Action (RA).** If the RI/FS reveals the need for corrective action, such action will be taken in the RA phase and programmed using Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) funds. First priority will be given to remedial actions to control contamination migrating from Navy or Marine Corps owned property when such migration poses an immediate threat to the health and welfare of the installation or the adjacent community. (R)

**c. Clearance for Non-DOD Site Inspectors.** Upon presentation of proper credentials, authorized representatives of state or federal environmental protection agencies must be allowed to enter a Navy or Marine Corps facility at reasonable times to examine or copy records, inspect inactive hazardous substance disposal facilities and to take samples. Proper credentials include an appropriate security clearance and a valid inspection purpose (e.g., Clean Air Act Inspection as opposed to OSHA inspection). See Section 11203(b)(2) of reference (1).

**d. The National Priorities List (NPL).** The NPL is a listing by the Environmental Protection Agency of the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. The listing, required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act (CERCLA), includes federal installations as well as private sites. Each site listed in the NPL is required by EPA Regulations (at 40 C.F.R. 300.67) to follow a (R)

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Community Relations\* Plan. See Article 0812 (IR-required Community Relations Plan).

**e. Study Release Policy.** It is DoN policy to provide completed studies to the news media and concerned local individuals and organizations on request. The following guidance is in keeping with the policy:

(1) Local and state officials, news media, interested organizations and individuals should be kept apprised of the IR activity at the commencement and conclusion of each phase of work. Completed studies should be released as soon as practical. The activity commanding officer is responsible for study release. As with all public disclosures, studies and related statements will undergo security and policy review before release. When environmental or public relations impact is expected to extend beyond the immediate area of the activity, the command should coordinate release of the study with the cognizant area coordinator.

(2) IR and related studies must be released to the cognizant EPA Regional Office and the appropriate state agency within 30 days of receipt of the study by the concerned activity.

(3) When local interest is high, periodic status reports of the field activities of the contractor performing the study should be provided.

(4) PAOs must coordinate the release of all information and preparation of contingency questions and answers with both the installation public works officer and the appropriate Naval Facilities Engineering Command Engineering Field Division representatives.

**f. Basic Points of Emphasis.** Commanders and their PAOs are encouraged to discuss IR studies and remedial actions within their areas of cognizance with local news media, civic and environmental organizations and individuals. Every effort should be made to avoid the impression that the Navy or Marine Corps is hiding an adverse environmental condition or withholding information on former hazardous waste sites. Points to emphasize include:

(1) The Navy and Marine Corps are concerned about and committed to protecting the environment. Commands will continue to pursue vigorous remedial action to clean up pollutants.

(2) Past hazardous waste disposal methods, although acceptable at the time, have often caused problems as long term characteristics of pollutants and land disposal became known.

(3) State and local agencies will be notified without delay by Navy or Marine Corps officials if health, welfare or other environmental problems are identified--even before publication of final technical reports.

(4) If an immediate hazard to human health or the environment is identified, remedial action will begin immediately.

\*Although the EPA titles it a Community Relations Plan, most of the actions in the plan are public information efforts aimed at the local community.

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## 0812 OTHER IR REQUIREMENTS

(R)

**a. IR Community Relations Plan Requirements.** The intent of public affairs involving hazardous waste problems is to present factual and timely information, obtain community feedback, dispel rumors and promote understanding. Public affairs efforts are not intended to persuade the public to support a given study outcome or disposal action. Accordingly, technical expertise is required to assist in the development of public affairs plans and initiatives related to hazardous waste. It is normally furnished by the installation Public Works Officer, Environmental Coordinator, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Engineering Field Division.

(1) The Plan must take into account the mandatory 21-day public comment period that precedes final selection of remedial action.

(2) The Plan must consist of:

(a) Background and history of community involvement at the site, including local activity and interest, key issues and site history;

(b) IR objectives for the particular site;

(c) Community relations activities to be used to meet stated objectives;

(d) A mailing list of the affected groups and individuals, plus a list of Navy, EPA and other agency officials responsible for community relations.

(3) The Community Relations Plan must be based on discussions with state and local officials, civic and community organizations, and interested residents to gain a first-hand understanding of the major community issues, the level of public interest and the information needs of the citizens. In early meetings with citizens, commands should be more intent on receiving input from them rather than furnishing information. Try to identify the real concerns of citizens (e.g., threats to health) which may be masked by emotional demands to effect immediate clean-up. Tell citizens that their contributions are valuable. Some may have technical expertise or offer information about responsible parties, the extent of off-site contamination, health hazards, etc.

(4) Public information activities must be closely integrated with the technical activities of site study and remedial action. A close working relationship should be built between the technical response staff, public affairs staff and contractors supporting the efforts.

(5) Decision Documents (i.e., those used to select the remedial action) must indicate in what ways community contribution was considered by decision

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makers and how it was incorporated into response plans.

- b. Technical Review Committee (TRC).** Regardless of the level of public interest at a site, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) A) requires a TRC be established. Comprising representatives of the Navy (activity and EFD), EPA, the state environmental agency and the impacted community, the TRC is a management element brought into play at the early stages of IR.

(1) The purpose of the TRC is to collect technical input from the regulators and the public on the problem being faced, and lay before regulators and the public member, the alternatives the Navy or Marine Corps will be considering to remedy the problem.

(2) The PAO can recommend citizens who could serve as the community representative. The PAO will attend TRC meetings as a staff assistant to the commanding officer to keep abreast of the total IR program and assess the changing information needs of the local communities, officials, et. al.

- c. Information Repositories.** Information repositories shall contain, at a A) minimum, copies of final reports on studies already conducted, copies of news releases, fact sheets, handouts, the Community Relations Plan and the minutes of the TRC meetings. Locations for information repositories shall be publicized through news releases and mailings to ensure that citizens know where they may review documents.

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**SECTION D:****TERRORIST THREAT AND ATTACK****0813 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT**

a. **General.** Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes, or the conduct or participation in such acts by sovereign states. Terrorists' power to intimidate is a function not only of the destructive power of their attack, but also its impact on the public through media coverage. References (d), (m) and (n) are basic resource documents.

b. **Recent History.** Since 1968, terrorist incidents have increased over three-fold, and more than half were directed against U. S. military facilities or personnel. Terrorist strikes grow more lethal every year.

c. **The Act of Terrorism.** Political terrorism is not a mindless act, but a calculated, rational attack employing surprise and concentration of force at a minimal expenditure of resources. Terrorist organizations most frequently act as instruments of state policy and, with the support of their state sponsor in intelligence and physical resources, can strike with relative impunity without regard for the degree of mass destruction or the number of casualties. Terrorism is not random violence; it is carefully planned and is often an integral part of a well-defined strategy, in which terrorists may act as agents of a hostile State. Their immediate objectives are psychological--building fear among a populace, inducing lack of confidence in the existing social order and provoking the existing government to adopt more repressive law enforcement policies.

d. **Terrorist Methods.** Terrorist attack may take one of the following forms:

(1) **Bombs.** Bombs may be used to destroy equipment, cause fires, create casualties or create a diversion for another form of attack.

(2) **Ambush.** Surprise attacks by individual terrorists or small groups intended to assassinate individuals, eliminate groups of Navy or Marine Corps personnel or destroy or steal assets in remote locations or while a unit is on patrol.

(3) **Armed Attack.** An armed assault is usually accompanied by one or more diversionary actions by small groups against key personnel or critical assets. The terrorists' objective in this form of attack is usually the disruption of mission activities and the creation of adverse publicity. Generally, unless the attackers are prevented from escaping, hostage-taking is not a normal outgrowth of this form of attack.

(4) **Sabotage.** Terrorist groups may engage in some form of sabotage to harass and enervate security forces. Saboteurs may be highly trained or rank amateurs, professional terrorists or disgruntled employees.

(5) **Hostage-Taking.** A group or individual may undertake the seizure of a specific hostage for random or political bargaining purposes. An armed attack scenario may be used to seize a critical asset (e.g., a ship, submarine or aircraft)

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when personnel are present to use both assets and people as a bargaining lever. This type of crisis directed at a Navy or Marine Corps activity could rapidly escalate to crisis management overview at the highest levels of government.

**e. Threat Types.** To facilitate the analysis and determination of the proper security countermeasures, various security threats are categorized by reference (d). Reference (d) establishes Threat Types One through Six which describe varying threats to a command, from a lone individual seeking to perpetrate a theft to an organized group of trained terrorists attempting to attack a facility. PAOs are not authorized to discuss threat types in specific detail nor link a particular threat type designation with a specific threat.

**f. Importance of Internal Information.** Commands must establish and maintain a rapid means of building local awareness when the threat of terrorist activity exists. Within the limits of security, this means of reaching the internal audience in such an emergency should be tested as part of a command's contingency exercise training program (i.e., the preparation of written announcements, the insertion of drill announcements during regularly scheduled programming by a Navy Broadcasting Service Detachment, etc.). The means by which the internal audience is informed in such an emergency will be specified in the Command Physical Security Plan discussed in reference (d). The internal information portion of the Command Physical Security Plan will consist of the following:

(1) Designation of a single point-of-contact for the release of information to the internal audience regarding antiterrorism measures and physical security posture;

(2) Designation of the internal information media to be employed;

(3) An ongoing program whereby awareness of the general terrorist threat is increased over a long period of time;

(4) A real-time, contingency program a commander may execute in the event a terrorist incident is likely. This program will include, within the limits of the command's capability:

(a) Formatted announcements\* to increase command awareness of the terrorist threat and the reasons and general nature of physical security measures ordered as a result of enhanced Threat Conditions [see Article 0814c (Target Hardening and Procedural Safeguards)];

(b) Formatted announcements\* to increase understanding of and compliance with personal protective measures [see references (d) and (m)];

(c) A means to quell rumor and misinformation (such as a command internal hotline available to families as well as military and civilian employees, a "call-in" show at an installation served by a Navy Broadcasting Service Detachment);

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\* Formatted announcements include newspaper articles, broadcast spots and other internal information items produced and approved in advance and positioned for use when conditions warrant.

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(d) A means by which personnel and families living off-base are informed of heightened security posture, the need to adopt personal protective measures, etc.

Commanders must balance the need to protect specific threat information (to avoid compromise of sources, methods or security posture in effect) with the need to provide useful information to personnel and their families. In actual practice, formatted announcements would undergo local security review prior to release to ensure that security is preserved and compromise is avoided. Increased security measures, while they may alleviate some anxiety among military personnel and families, may also increase apprehension and result in minor inconveniences which should be explained.

**g. Importance of Public Information.** In a terrorist or other unconventional threat situation, the ultimate responsibility of the command is to retain its capability to accomplish assigned missions while safeguarding security and personnel welfare. An ongoing terrorist incident does not relieve a commander of the responsibility to keep the public informed. Except as it may reveal information of value to the terrorist or threaten the safety of any hostages, information must be released to keep the public informed of fast-breaking events. Acts of violence naturally attract media coverage, and the commander is thrust into the situation where action must be taken to counter the threat and accomodate natural public interest in an important news event. The PAO is a key member of the command's team to combat terrorism and must become thoroughly familiar with references (d), (m) and (n) and participate in contingency exercises, command crisis response force planning, the physical security review committee and similar command organizations.

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**0814 ANTITERRORISM ORGANIZATION**

a. **General.** Antiterrorism is defined as those defensive measures used by DoD to reduce the vulnerability of DoD personnel, their dependents, facilities and equipment to terrorist acts. The most cost-effective, broad-based means of launching an antiterrorism effort is to integrate it as much as possible with crisis management procedures established to prevent, control or contain natural and man-made disasters. Essentially, antiterrorism encompasses two defensive measures designed to prevent terrorist acts: intelligence and target hardening/procedural safeguards.

b. **Intelligence.** Commands must have adequate information and threat assessment to prepare for or forestall a terrorist incident. Local protective measures are based on a careful assessment of the terrorist threat. Commands must have the means to disseminate rapidly any change in the likelihood or nature of a terrorist attack, balancing the actual release of information to the internal audience between the need to protect sources and withhold essential security posture with the need to keep personnel and families informed.

c. **Target Hardening and Procedural Safeguards.** Physical security measures are established to increase both the costs and risks to the more dedicated, professional terrorist. As threat conditions increase, greater safeguards are ordered. These safeguards are ordered by competent authority in concert with the establishment of threat conditions. Threat conditions (designated ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, etc.) are promulgated by CNO. As the likelihood of terrorist attack increases, a new Threat Condition is ordered, prescribing new procedural safeguards to enable the command to resist or frustrate the potential attack. Commands are not authorized to discuss Threat Conditions in detail nor link safeguards with specific Threat Conditions. PAOs should note, however, that with each Threat Condition, changes must be effected in the daily conduct of both military and family affairs on base. The PAO may play a direct role in communicating these changes to the internal audience or an indirect yet no less important role in alleviating undue alarm as these procedural safeguards are implemented and enforced.

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**0815 RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON ANTITERRORISM MATTERS**

**a. General.** The Department of Defense pursues a policy of limited acknowledgement regarding physical security and antiterrorism. While commands may be motivated to disclose information in the interest of building public confidence and deterring terrorist acts, increased disclosure may reveal security posture, antiterrorist measures in force and ultimately endanger personnel and families.

**b. Release Authority**

(1) All terrorist incidents shall be reported immediately via the chain of command to ASD(PA), CHINFO (or DIRPA) and the chain of command.

(2) No public release of information regarding such an incident shall be made without the approval of ASD(PA) except when the on-scene commander determines that failure to do so would place people in jeopardy.

(3) ASD(PA) will coordinate news releases on incidents involving officials or property of foreign governments or foreign organizations in the United States with the Department of State, via the chain of command.

(4) Public affairs guidance will be provided to the units or activities involved by ASD(PA).

**c. Information Regarding Antiterrorism.** The following guidance pertains to the release of information regarding antiterrorism:

(1) Department of Defense officials, senior leaders, commanders and knowledgeable individuals may discuss antiterrorism as it pertains to those areas and installations for which they are responsible;

(2) Antiterrorism measures and procedures will be discussed only in a general way without going into a checklist of specific details; likewise, threat types, threat conditions and associated physical security measures should not be discussed publicly in detail;

(3) Media requests to photograph, film or videotape antiterrorism training or the implementation of any antiterrorism measures will be approved on a case by case basis by ASD(PA). Commands should not prevent the documentation of measures being imposed at or in the immediate vicinity of gates and fences when those measures are in the clear view of any member of the public, although the identity and media affiliation of the camera operators may be ascertained.

(4) Visual media coverage of antiterrorist training and the implementation of physical security measures not in clear public view should be forwarded through channels for approval by the CNO (Assistant for Naval Investigative Matters and Security) (OP-09N) or CMC (Code INTC). This includes requests by internal information media.

(5) Changes to physical security measures in force may attract public attention. Spokespersons may, if appropriate, acknowledge that increased security precautions have been or will be taken. They may acknowledge the obvious. For example, increased measures such as additional guards at a gate, if obvious to the

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public, may be acknowledged. Great care and sound judgement must be exercised in discussions, however, to avoid revealing implementation of specific security measures.

(6) Media representatives may attempt to relate a local security enhancement to a larger effort being undertaken throughout a given region or throughout all services. Spokes- persons should reiterate that it is the responsibility of the individual commanding officer to implement necessary security actions, and it is the commanding officer who is ultimately responsible for both information and physical security.

(7) If asked whether physical security measures are being taken in response to specific threats, spokespersons should note that it is the Department of the Navy's policy not to discuss specific threats.

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**0816 RELEASE OF INFORMATION REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM**

a. General. Limited acknowledgment is the Department of Defense policy on counterterrorism and counterterrorist forces.

b. Requests for Information Regarding Counterterrorism. The following statement may be used to respond to queries regarding counterterrorism and counterterrorist forces:

"The U. S. Government has trained personnel and specialized equipment from all four services to cope with terrorist incidents. Command and control elements for these forces exist and have been exercised. The elements report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as do other command and control elements for any military operation. We do not comment on their identity, tactics or any details concerning the circumstances under which these forces may be deployed."

c. Release Authority. With the exception of the statement in Article 0816b above, no information concerning counterterrorist forces will be released unless authorized by the National Command Authority. ASD(PA) is the single point of contact for the release of information concerning counterterrorist activities. Requests for interviews, photography, filming, videotaping or further information regarding counterterrorist forces, their facilities or their training will not be approved. Questions beyond the scope of this guidance shall be referred to ASD(PA).

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**G-0816 PROGRESSION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION IN A  
TERRORIST SITUATION**

**a. General.** A terrorist event thrusts the PAO and staff into an intense, highly visible and normally prolonged encounter with representatives of a host of major news media. Unlike many press relations experiences, the handling of media during a terrorist incident is unique, because the perpetrators desire to use the news media to help achieve psychological advantage. To prepare for contingency, the PAO must plan and train to accommodate intense media interest during the event and, in the event of hostages, in the post-incident phase.

**b. Action before an Incident.** The following actions are recommended to assist the PAO, public affairs staff and the unit commander in meeting command responsibilities for public affairs during a terrorist incident.

(1) Maintain a good working relationship with local news media representatives. Ensure they understand the security constraints and ground rules they can expect to encounter during a terrorist event. [As an example, review Article G-0816c(7) below; the press will be asked to refrain from disclosing or commenting on actions by any police or military security forces they may observe. Briefing the press on this ground rule before a terrorist incident will improve press understanding of the military's position and, more importantly, ease the job of press coordination at the time of an incident.] Do not divulge anti-or counterterrorism plans. Avoid specific details. Address issues in broad terms, giving reporters a mental picture of what they can expect from the command.

(2) Establish and maintain working relations with spokespersons of neighboring agencies (other military activities, law enforcement agencies, other U. S. government agencies, foreign government agencies, etc.).

(3) If abroad, become acquainted with host government press officers and embassy press attaches who would be called upon to act as spokesperson in the event of a terrorist attack.

(4) Activate a CIB as a simulation during command contingency exercises.

(5) Prepare a plan for the accreditation of the press. The plan should be designed to accommodate a large influx of foreign and domestic press from other locations. The military commander and their security force must be able to screen news personnel carefully, and the PAO must be able to certify that only bona fide news media representatives are registered by the accreditation system. Terrorists could pose as reporters to get close to the scene of action.

**c. Action during an Incident.** The following actions are provided as guidelines to assist commanders, PAOs and their staffs when a terrorist attack has occurred.

(1) Establish a CIB with positive communication and direct access to the on-scene commander. Act as the central official spokesperson and sole releasing authority for information releasable at the local level.

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(2) Seek to provide essential, factual information to the press during the course of an incident. Without sensationalizing the situation, convey the government's condemnation of lawless violence. Quell rumors by issuing frequent, factual, informative statements.

(3) Limit the release of biographical data on crisis management members; review Article 0507 (Release of Information that Could Endanger Personnel). Personal information, including the identity, of counterterrorist force members is not releasable [only ASD(PA) can grant exception to this policy] and may be classified. See Article 0816c (Release Authority).

(4) Ensure that the spokesperson has a fully informed and available deputy. If the incident goes on for several hours or days, it may be desirable to employ the deputy periodically. The objective is to preclude mis-statements brought about by fatigue. The deputy spokesperson should closely monitor the entire course of the terrorist incident to assure continuity, familiarity and accessibility when called upon.

(5) Locate the CIB or press area as near to the scene as possible but in an area which will not present a hazard to the press, increase the likelihood of a security compromise or inadvertently provide a media outlet to the perpetrator

(6) Deal only with accredited news media representatives.

(7) Discourage the media from approaching the incident site or establishing direct contact with or live coverage of the perpetrators, explaining that such action may provide a tactical or psychological advantage to the terrorist and, in situations where hostages have been taken, threaten the lives of hostages. Likewise, discourage the media from reporting on any operational activities of the police, military or other government forces.

(8) Review each proposed release to eliminate any statements which appear to place the spokesperson in a position of acting as "messenger" for the terrorists to the public.

(9) Permit no press contact with the crisis management team or rescue force unless authorized. Provide access to other appropriate officials and experts who can provide background to the press on unclassified aspects of the event. See Article G-0816e (Need for Pre-Media Briefings.).

**d. Action Following an Incident.** Following a terrorist incident commands must respond to continued media interest in the incident, interview of any returned hostages and coverage of next-of-kin reactions. Also, commands should concentrate on sharing, within the bounds of security, lessons learned from the incident.

(1) Hold a command briefing, involving other participating agencies to discuss problems encountered and new procedures that should be implemented.

(2) Hold a background debriefing session with news media representatives to exchange views, providing perspective and official comment when necessary.

(3) Submit a narrative after-action report on public affairs handling of the incident via the chain of command to CHINFO or DIRPA.



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(4) The PAO should accompany returning hostages to brief them before their first news media encounter.

(5) When next of kin of hostages or of persons injured in a terrorist incident are notified by a Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO), a PAO should be dispatched by the appropriate command, when possible, to accompany the CACO. The PAO may then offer to assist the family and provide the CACO public affairs guidance. Relatives' homes are often "staked out" by news media who want to interview the next of kin or any visiting Navy officials.

(6) The PAO should offer assistance to both returned hostages and the families to shield them from unwanted news media attention. The PAO can screen visitors and callers, allowing genuine friends and relatives to make contact while allowing the PAO to respond to news media queries.

**e. Need for Pre-Media Briefing.** News media play a predominant role in every stage of a terrorist event. Before an attack, correspondents customarily have asked about command security posture, and electronic newsgathering teams have taken video of additional gate guards, new barriers or other physical and procedural enhancements visible from public roads. Soon after an attack, reporters clamor for more information, electronic media cover the event live and terrorists seek to use the media to their advantage. After the event, news media continue to focus on the event and doubtless undergo a process of self-examination to determine weaknesses in their handling of the situation. At any stage of this progression, news media will seek to interview personnel involved. Because of the sensitivity of anti- and counter-terrorist operations, authority to permit the interview must be obtained and, if and when granted, such personnel must be properly briefed. Personal information, including the identity, of counterterrorist force members is not releasable [only ASD(PA) can grant exception to this policy] and may be classified. See Article 0816c (Release Authority).

**f. Preparing People for a Media Encounter.** Commands cannot reasonably expect to shelter every key participant or informed individual from media attention during or after a terrorist incident. Interviews and exchanges of information with media will occur, so it is crucial that the PAO, acting as central spokesperson for the command, brief command other personnel before their media encounter. The PAO briefs not only the on-scene commander, but also members of the hostage rescue force if such an interview is authorized, former hostages who volunteer or are consulted to provide perspective on a hostage-taking situation and hostages' next-of-kin.

**g. Briefing Points.** In these pre-media-encounter briefings, the PAO should tell concerned personnel and relatives the questions they can expect from the news media, including guidance on what issues or topics can and cannot be matters of discussion. In a time of high stress, a mis-statement by a military member, other official or a hostage's relative can complicate efforts to gain hostages' release. Therefore interviews with relatives or actual participants are not recommended during the event. Whenever such interviews take place, the following may be used as a guide in formulating briefing points:

(1) "The news media are interested in getting as many details as they can. You are a potential source of new information about the incident itself or the people involved."

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(2) "The decision to be interviewed is entirely your own. You are not required to talk with a reporter, and you have the right to remain silent. If you agree to be interviewed before the terrorist crisis is over, what you say will doubtless be learned by the terrorists, so make comments with extreme care. (For relatives or friends of a hostage:) Do not discuss the hostages themselves--personal details, backgrounds on the hostages, their relatives or friends, etc."

(3) "If you agree to be interviewed or want to know why you should talk with the news media, there are some excellent reasons to do so, particularly after the incident is over. You may wish to mention an act of heroism or pay tribute to someone who helped in a special way. The American people have an honest interest in this situation, and you can help them understand how you personally feel or why you acted in a certain way."

(4) "If you do talk to the news media,

(a) Discuss unclassified aspects of your own personal experiences and feelings;

(b) Avoid operational details which may be classified due to operations security;

(c) If you are critical of certain aspects of the operation, I recommend you refrain from discussing this publicly. Such statements may hamper the conduct or the subsequent investigation of the operation;

(d) Don't speculate by answering "what if" questions;

(e) Don't criticize someone else's actions, since you may not know the details or the motivation of others;

(f) Don't repeat stories you're unsure of and don't spread rumors."

(5) "As Public Affairs Officer, I will monitor your encounter with the news media, and, if I feel you are getting into trouble, I will help you."

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## SECTION E

## COMBAT/WARTIME PUBLIC AFFAIRS

## 0817 INTRODUCTION

**a. Applicability.** This section provides background information to prepare commanders, PAOs and their staffs when special public affairs policies and procedures are implemented at the onset of hostilities, limited or general war and at the order of competent authority for exercise purposes. Should policy in this section conflict with the orders of Unified or Specified Commands, including joint task force commanders, the latter take precedence.

**b. OSD/JCS Public Affairs Guidance.** Reference (a) provides the foundation upon which Unified or Specified Command PAOs and staffs of component commands develop contingency annexes. JOPS Volume I contains the standard methods of carrying out the public affairs function during an operation or other contingency. Unified, Specified or joint task force commanders may use JOPS Volume I as a standing guide for a particular operation or may reference the volume and adapt particular articles to suit the contingency.

**c. Censorship.** In a combat situation, the objectives of public information are to ensure the prompt release of information to the public consistent with security and to prevent disclosure of information which could assist the enemy. Field Press Censorship (FPC) in an area of operations will normally not be invoked. If such a program is implemented, ASD(PA) will provide guidance to concerned commands. FPC is concerned solely with the security review of press products and do not concern accreditation, support to media (i.e., transportation, communications, etc.) or the processing of internal information.

(1) The Unified or Specified Commander in Chief will be responsible for implementing FPC in the operational area if FPC is invoked. Commands outside the operational area will receive FPC policy guidance and instructions from ASD(PA).

(2) Unless FPC is invoked by higher authority, no attempt will be made to censor copy to be filed over military communications facilities. The exception to this policy is security review agreed to as a ground rule in advance of cooperation with a correspondent, as in embarkation of news media; see Article 0306j (News Media Embarkations). Copy filed over military communications channels will be reviewed prior to transmission and violations of Operations Security (OPSEC) will be called to the attention of the correspondent who prepared the article. If the copy is not redrafted to overcome valid security objections, the disputed copy will be incorporated in an official message which explains the circumstances and sent by secure communications to OASD(PA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for review, resolution and ultimate release. The message should also be sent to intermediate commanders in the chain for information. Copy will not be refused solely because it is critical, derogatory, uncomplimentary or embarrassing. For guidance on OPSEC matters, see reference (j).

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**0818 NEWS MEDIA ACCREDITATION**

**a. Background.** Accreditation is the process of providing official authorization and DoD-recognized credentials to correspondents. The purpose of accreditation is to ensure that legitimate news media representatives are given opportunities to gather material for news stories and features without compromising operational security.

(1) During normal peacetime operations, the Department of Defense does not implement a system of accreditation of correspondents, and the Navy Department does not issue letters of accreditation (or accreditation cards). Accreditation may be invoked, however, at the outbreak of hostilities.

**b. Implementing Accreditation.** Normally, the unified commander implements an accreditation program and specifies who receives accreditation and how many may obtain it.

(1) Accreditation may be ordered by competent authority if terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred. Terrorists may pose as media representatives to gain a tactical or intelligence gathering advantage. See Article 0817 (Progression of Public Affairs Actions in a Terrorist Situation).

(2) Numerous factors should bear on a commander's decision to implement accreditation and afford media privileges and responsibilities of accredited correspondents. Among these factors are:

(a) Available public affairs resources. Accreditation numbers are related to the public affairs office staffing level to meet the needs of correspondents seeking to cover hostilities.

(b) Host nation sensitivities. Host nation government officials and media may desire or oppose the implementation of accreditation. Accreditation of correspondents is dependent on their obtaining a host nation visa and State Department approval.

(c) Geography and weather. Geographic features and weather conditions may complicate the provision of substantial yet equal assistance to media, thus encouraging the implementation of accreditation.

(d) Type of ensuing conflict. The element of surprise, concentration or dispersal of forces and other military factors will influence the decision to implement accreditation.

(3) If implemented, only bona fide news media correspondents and associates (e.g., electronic newsgathering team members) will receive accreditation.

(4) Accreditation is an agreement between the authorizing command and the correspondent. The correspondent agrees to abide by the command's ground rules and the command agrees to provide appropriate opportunities for interviews, information and video or photo opportunities of people, events and locales. In addition, the command agrees to furnish limited travel, communication, messing, berthing, medical and other means of support. [For a discussion of these support factors, see Article 0306j (News Media Embarkations).] Correspondents without proper accreditation will not receive briefings or support from commands.

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(5) Figure 8-1 is a sample news media accreditation card and public affairs office file record.

**FIGURE 8-1**

**SAMPLE ACCREDITATION CARD**

**(COMMAND) ACCREDITATION CARD**

**Serial Number:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date of Issue:** \_\_\_\_\_

This card certifies that the below-named individual is accredited by the Commander, (command), for (indicate timeframe, duration of a specific evolution or exercise, etc.). As such, the bearer of this card should be shown all courtesies and assisted by public affairs personnel to obtain unclassified information for eventual release to the public. The below-named individual is not authorized access to classified information or to "Limited" or other security areas.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(name and signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(name of parent news agency)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(name and signature of PAO)

**Public Affairs Office File Card**

**CORRESPONDENT ACCREDITATION Serial Number:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Full Name of Correspondent:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Home Address and Phone Number:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Parent News Agency:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address and Phone Number:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name of Supervisor (editor, etc.):** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date Issued:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Nationality:** \_\_\_\_\_

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**0819 ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE  
(AFRTS) DURING CONTINGENCIES**

**a. Mission of AFRTS Contingency Operations.** The mission of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) in a contingency is to provide the Unified or joint task force commander with AFRTS radio and television service during special operations, conflicts and other contingencies. The Navy Broadcasting Service is the executive agent for AFRTS contingency operations and provides personnel and systems to support forces ashore. Service consists of recorded radio and television programming from the AFRTS Broadcast Center, Los Angeles, CA, and locally originated command internal information based on the requirements of the local commander.

**b. Mobile Detachments and their Deployment.** Navy Broadcasting Service maintains shelters equipped for transmitting AFRTS radio and television programming ashore in a wide variety of contingencies. Additional shelters serving as television production studios and storage facilities can also be deployed. Mobile detachment personnel are provided from Navy, Army and Air Force commands with augmentation possible from two Naval Reserve units assigned to Navy Broadcasting Service. Shelters, personnel and equipment are deployed from the Navy Broadcasting Service Fleet Support Detachments in San Diego, CA, and Norfolk, VA.

**c. Conditions for Deployment.** Friendly forces must have control of an area and the area should be relatively stabilized before broadcast operations begin. Conditions must be such that U. S. forces have sufficient time to listen to radio or watch television on a somewhat regular basis. Broadcast operations can proceed under full or partial mobilization or under non-mobilization conditions.

**d. Legal Considerations.** Before radio or television operations can commence, permission must be granted by the host government to operate the service. In a crisis involving a hostile host government, operations may be conducted without permission. Radio service requires a frequency between 88.1 MHz and 107.9 MHz. Because of the type of equipment used by Navy Broadcasting Service Mobile Detachments, television transmission on channel 8 (180-186 MHz) or channel 11 (198-204 MHz) is necessary.

**e. Deployment of a Mobile Detachment.** Unified and joint task force commanders must select one of four levels of AFRT service to support an impending operation. The Director, Navy Broadcasting Service, or the CHINFO duty officer after hours will be notified by message of the contingency and the desired level of service, location of the operation, the date at which service should begin, approved television and FM radio frequencies and information on shipping requirements to the point of embarkation. The Director, Navy Broadcasting Service, then notifies the Air Force and Army Broadcasting Services to identify and order personnel to report to the embarkation point on a specified date and requests AFRTS programming from the AFRTS Broadcast Center. The cognizant Fleet Support Detachment issues organizational clothing and small arms prior to deployment. If required, personnel and equipment can report to the embarkation point not later than 72 hours following initial notification, and the Detachment can be on air within 24 hours of arrival at the broadcast site.

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**f. Levels of Service**

<b><u>SERVICE</u></b>	<b><u>CAPABILITY</u></b>	<b><u>PERSONNEL*</u></b>	<b><u>EQUIPMENT</u></b>
Type I	FM Radio (18 hrs/day)	Navy CPOIC Navy IC 4747 USAF E5 79151 USA E5 71R20	1 electronics shelter, 1 CONEX box. Cube 980, weight: 10,250.
Type II	TV (8 hrs/day) (no local origi- nation. FM Radio (18 hrs/day)	Navy 1650 OIC Navy IC4747 USAF E5 79151 USAF E5 79151 USA E6 71R30 USA E5 71R30	Same as above.
Type III	TV (12 hrs/day) (limited local origination) FM radio 24 hours.day.	USA O2 PAO Navy IC4747 Navy E5 3221 USAF E7 79151 USAF E5 79151 USAF E5 79151 USA E6 71R30 USA E5 71R30 USA E5 26T20	2 electronics shelters, 1 Cube 1595. Weight 11,520
Type IV	Same as Type III with SATNET as addition.	Same as Type III.	Same as Type III, Cube 3,703 Weight 31,520.

**g. Support Required from Host Command**

- (1) 10 KW, 115V, 60 cycle power.
- (2) Prearranged VHF and FM frequencies from host nation in accordance with subparagraph d above.
- (3) Petroleum, oil and lubricant support.
- (4) Ground transportation.
- (5) Security.
- (6) Personnel and administrative support.
- (7) Communications support.
- (8) Adequate, periodic access to the commander to ensure an effective internal information program.

\* -- Personnel must be capable of reporting on 72 hours notice, have a current, up-to-date immunization record, a current small arms qualification. Personal affairs must also be in order (e.g., direct deposit or pay record on hand).



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**0820 THE MEDIA POOL AND PRESS COVERAGE OF SENSITIVE OPERATIONS**

a. **Background.** A basic principle of DoD public affairs is that the American people must be informed about the employment of U. S. military forces through an independent press given access by the operational commander. Access, especially to sensitive operations in advance of a planned attack, may compromise security and lead to loss of life. Both media and military must meet half-way, meeting legitimate concerns of security and safety as well as equally legitimate interests of the American public.

(1) The military commander must determine the conditions of coverage which will allow objective, comprehensive coverage while assuring troop safety and mission security.

(2) Conditions of coverage usually lead to voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued in advance by the military.

(3) Because of security, troop safety and military resources, one of the conditions of coverage of initial operations before open coverage is feasible may be the pooling of reporters and their news products.

(4) A violation of the trust by a correspondent who is a member of the pool could lead to his or her exclusion from coverage opportunities during the operation (including briefings and other means of support) and possibly exclusion from future opportunities to cover military operations.

b. **The Pool Concept.** A media pool is a predetermined number of correspondents who are supported by the military in their coverage of an operation or exercise and whose materials are freely shared with other news agencies. Pools can be established and operated at various levels of the chain of command. ASD(PA) maintains the DoD National News Media Pool to provide one secure means by which news media may cover significant or sensitive operations or exercises. Local or theater level media pools can also be arranged at other levels of the chain. Locally arranged pools are often necessitated by transportation limitations. Basic principles of pool establishment and operation are discussed in this article and can be adapted for local use.

(1) Leadership of U. S. news agencies believe that unrestricted access to key events is the best way to provide the public with objective, comprehensive coverage in order to stimulate a free flow of ideas. Accordingly, they are generally not in favor of pooling access to such events or to pooling news materials for the common use of all news agencies. However, logistics and other considerations may outweigh this concern. If Operations Security (OPSEC) considerations dictate that widespread media knowledge of an impending operation would threaten both mission and troop safety, the only feasible means of furnishing the media early access to an operation may be through employment of the DoD National News Media Pool. For guidance on OPSEC, see reference (j). Accordingly, all plans for contingency operations should make provisions to accommodate such deployment.

(2) Ideally, pool membership reflects the widest variety of types of media. That is, within one pool, one television network will represent and share materials with all TV networks, one newspaper represents all local newspapers, one agency

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reports for all wire services, etc. A typical pool would be comprised of one newspaper correspondent, one radio network representative, a newsgathering team from a local television station, one wire service reporter, one wire service photographer and one newsmagazine reporter. Once all interested agencies agree to ground rules, assignment of reporters is set up on a rotating basis. The pool assignments rotate every quarter. A reporter from newspaper "A" might be assigned to the pool established for contingencies during the first quarter of the year, reporter from newspaper "B" assigned to the pool for the second quarter, etc.

(3) Pool activation is the prerogative of the officer in command and is based on OPSEC, transportation and other considerations. For example, pools may be activated in secret in advance of sortie, or pool members may be called later to join a unit already underway via helicopter or Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) aircraft.

(4) Prior to obtaining a media pool "assignment," correspondents and their editors or news managers must agree in advance to ground rules. In the case of a DoD Media Pool, secrecy about the operation is maintained until the authorized DoD spokesperson announces that a media pool has been deployed.

(5) Products of media pool participants are shipped or transmitted electronically (via immediate precedence message) to a central point (usually ASD(PA) for DOD Media Pools) for pick-up and common use of all interested news media.

(6) Under favorable circumstances, the media pool would be terminated in a lengthy operation in favor of maximum possible news coverage by competing agencies.

(7) In many areas of the world, an established press presence would be encountered by U. S. forces regardless of whether or not a U. S. press pool was established. Accordingly, PAOs must be included at the earliest stages of operational planning, and one of the factors on which a pool decision would be based is the extent of press presence already in the area of operations.

**c. Pool Membership.** Pool membership should be accorded those organizations which cover the widest American audiences. Consideration should also be given to including non-U. S. news media, where appropriate, overseas. Tailored for various contingency operations, the DoD National News Media Pool serves as a model for organizing other press pools. Pool participants include 26 newspaper organizations, three news magazines, three wire services, eight radio organizations and the four major television networks. All participants serve on a rotating basis, and specific individuals are placed on the pool roster by name to streamline both notification and screening at the designated military departure point. The DoD National News Media Pool normally numbers 14 inclusive of military escorts and is organized in the following fashion:

(1) **Wire Services.** The Associated Press, United Press International and Reuters participate in the pool on a rotating basis. If space for only two wire representatives were available on a particular pool, the reporter might be from the AP and the wire service pool photographer an employee of UPI.

(2) **Television.** A three-person electronic newsgathering team is drawn from one of the following networks on a rotating basis: ABC, CBS, CNN or NBC.

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(3) **Radio.** A representative of one of the major radio networks or syndicates (Mutual Radio, etc.) will serve as a member of the pool.

(4) **Newspapers.** Representation from one to three of the Nation's major daily newspapers (Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, etc.) provides the special aspects of newspaper coverage to complement that usually provided by wire service treatment.

(5) **News Magazines.** A reporter and photographer from one of the national newsmagazines will be assigned to the pool.

**d. Concept of Operations.** Although pool deployment would vary with changing operational circumstances, the following can be considered a typical scenario.

(1) Press leadership (e.g., bureau chiefs) are notified that their pool personnel should report to a specific location by a certain time. OPSEC should be stressed.

(2) Public affairs escorts screen correspondents for passports and immunization records; complete waiver of liability agreements for travel in a government vehicle, invitational travel orders, next-of-kin notification forms, accreditation forms and cards; and provide a briefing on the exercise, safety considerations for the pool participants and ground rules governing event coverage.

(3) Periodic briefings are provided the pool during the transit to the operation area. Preferably, operational commanders or their representatives should provide comments and participate in briefings.

(4) Media pool participants are granted access to military communication and transportation to gain coverage and file products. When available, civilian services should be used rather than operational military circuits and shipment resources.

(5) Pool messages must receive handling as "IMMEDIATE" precedence messages and should include clear, precise passing instructions to ensure quick dissemination upon receipt at the distributing office. Pool product reproduction and distribution procedures should be worked out with and agreed upon by participating media before the pool deploys.

**e. Typical Groundrules Governing Pool Deployment**

(1) "You have been selected to participate as a member of the (command) media pool in an operation on which you will soon be briefed. These groundrules will protect both the security of the operation and safety of troops while allowing you and other pool participants the greatest possible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all U. S. news media."

(2) "You may not mention to anyone the fact that the pool has been activated." \*

(3) "You may not file stories, or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until all stories and all other material (video, sound bites, etc.) have been pooled with other news organizations. This pooling may

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take place at a briefing immediately following the operation or by filing from military communication facilities. You will be expected to brief other members of the press concerning your experiences at this briefing. Detailed instructions on filing procedures will be provided later."

(4) "You must remain with the assigned escort officers at all times, unless released, and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting, but are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety."

(5) "You will receive a briefing regarding safety precautions to observe during embarkations in ships and aircraft, and you are obliged to follow these instructions."

(6) "Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool."

(7) "Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these rules and willingness to abide by them."

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\* Unless, of course, pool deployment is unclassified and public announcement of the deployment is not embargoed. Secrecy of pool deployment prior to official announcement is of paramount importance during special exercises and real-world operations.

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## 0821 NAVAL COMBAT DOCUMENTATION

a. **General.** Official visual information documentation--motion picture, video tape and still photography--is used for operational and combat support as well as public affairs purposes. It is an essential aspect of significant operations, exercises and evolutions. Such documentation provides a one-time visual record of Navy and Marine Corps participation in significant and often historical events and is used in numerous ways. Combat documentation is used for:

- (1) Operational status briefings,
- (2) Collateral intelligence,
- (3) Release of information to the public and news media,
- (4) After-action reports,
- (5) Historical records.

Use of combat documentation for public affairs purposes is especially important when news media representatives themselves are not on the scene or are delayed in reaching the combat area.

b. **Combat Documentation: An Operational Tool.** When the purpose of combat documentation is kept in mind and the function performed by Navy or Marine Corps photographers and camera operators is given sufficient priority by the operational commander, the military retains an important tool that can be used to counter enemy propaganda, advise congressional leadership, inform the public and provide military planners with visual intelligence on which to base decisions. Operational commanders should not confuse combat documentation with "press photography" or restrict official photographers from key events, because the events are "sensitive" or because the resultant visual material may reveal classified information. Documentation often yields intelligence on which operational decisions are made. Moreover, in the public arena, adversaries have been known to manipulate the media through carefully-timed release of biased stories. Without combat documentation, leaders and spokespersons are often left to counter the propaganda with words only.

c. **Basic Combat Documentation Guidance.** Policy and procedures for combat documentation are provided in reference (a), as discussed in Article 0818b (JCS Public Affairs Guidance), and will be modified by the unified commander to suit the circumstances. Policy and procedural guidance on visual information matters is provided in reference (o). Note also that combat documentation is addressed as a key element in public affairs planning for an operation or exercise [see Article 0605 (Basic Public Affairs Planning)]. The following general guidelines are based on JOPS and are provided to introduce commanders and public affairs personnel to the basic concepts involved in combat documentation planning.

(1) JOPS guidance is based on the use of combat documentation teams operating through a single, pre-defined chain of command and integrating operational documentation and public affairs disciplines within the same team.

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(2) The operational commander states the priorities for combat documentation (e.g., intelligence, operation briefings, public information release, etc.) to assist subordinates in managing assets.

(3) The combat documentation team normally will be the only source of visual information for later dissemination to news media not on-scene or delayed in reaching the operational area.

(4) The unified commander may task the most available Service or component audiovisual team to deploy in support of the combat documentation plan.

(5) After deployment of the team, other component commanders requiring combat documentation or desiring deployment of additional assets will coordinate their requests with either the unified commander or a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) (analogous to a command information bureau established to support joint operations).

(6) Normally, the unified commander may delegate release authority to the officer in charge of the JIB following initial announcement of commencement of operations.

(7) In advance of specific guidance, Service or component combat documentation teams will provide pre-edited video tape and still, unclassified photography (both black-and-white and color) during the operation to meet combat documentation priorities. Generally desirable coverage which the officer in charge of the JIB should detail for the teams includes:

- (a) Major units involved in the operation (i.e., "action shots");
- (b) Military structures and emplacements;
- (c) Initial force landings (para-drops, vertical and sea-borne amphibious assaults, etc.);
- (d) Unclassified press and VIP briefings;
- (e) Headquarters staff evolutions;
- (f) Communications facilities and field radio use;
- (g) New systems and equipment in use;
- (h) Prisoners of war and detainees;
- (i) Local populace;
- (j) Accidents and incidents;
- (k) Tactical movements and maneuvers;
- (l) Captured weapons and facilities;
- (m) Rescues;

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(n) Interviews with various troops and commanders;

(o) Community relations or humanitarian assistance projects.

(8) The PAO will personally brief the combat documentation team to ensure they understand the events and subjects they are to cover and the priority of each task.

(9) Shipments will be made in accordance with JOPS unless modified by the Unified Commander. Normally, shipments of combat documentation material will be made to ASD(PA) with an advisory message which includes intermediate commanders; Commander, Naval Imaging Command; CHINFO or DIRPA as information addressees.

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**SECTION F****COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS****0822 PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO DOD OPERATIONS  
THAT SUPPORT COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS****a. General**

(1) The potential to attract national and international attention to what normally would be routine military operations has increased significantly since the expansion of the DoD role in counternarcotics operations. Keep the chain of command informed any time it appears that DoD involvement in a counternarcotics operation may get national or international media interest. Many aspects of counternarcotics operations are inherently sensitive and involve various risks which may be heightened by the release of information to the public. They include:

- (a) Risks to the personal safety of law enforcement personnel involved in drug investigations, seizures, arrests and other related activities;
- (b) The risk of jeopardizing follow-on activities related to a drug seizure or arrest;
- (c) The risk of jeopardizing the prosecution of people arrested for drug-related offenses;
- (d) Risks to the operational security of on-going operations;
- (e) Risks to intelligence systems and sources; and
- (f) The risks to relations with other governments whose citizens, vessels, territory, etc. may be involved in drug-related activities. The risks can be minimized only through a comprehensive coordination process before any information is released to the public.

(2) Most drug seizures, arrests, etc. will be the result of cooperative efforts among some number of law enforcement and DoD agencies and organizations. Rarely will a single agency or organization be able to take full credit for an arrest or seizure. By their nature, DoD counternarcotics efforts will never be unilateral. They will always be **in support of** U.S. law enforcement agencies or cooperating host military, police or security forces. Additionally, most DoD counternarcotics efforts will not be service specific, but joint efforts designed to support the nation's drug control program.

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**b. Policy**

**(1) Policy Statements.** DoD components will not attempt to discuss or interpret overall DoD policy publicly, regarding armed forces support of the President's national drug control strategy. Components may provide copies of speeches and other printed material originated within OSD, but will refer to OASD(PA) any news media questions on matters beyond their purview.

**(2) Mission Statements.** Previously approved statements and associated Q's and A's pertaining to unified/specified command missions in the DoD effort may be used by the commands concerned and the military departments for public affairs purposes as they deem appropriate.

**(3) Announcements of Investigations, Seizures and Arrests.** The announcement regarding a drug-related investigation, seizure or arrest normally will be made by the agency or organization that actually made the seizure or arrest. Such announcements will indicate that the operation was a "coordinated federal effort" and will list participating agencies or organizations following coordination with each.

**(4) News Media Travel on DoD Missions.** The Secretary of Defense has approved the consideration of requests for news media travel with DoD elements on counternarcotics missions, on a case-by-case basis. The ASD(PA) is the approval authority for such travel.

**(5) Internal Information.** DoD efforts in counternarcotics operations will be of great interest to our internal audiences as well as the general public. However, the internal use of descriptions, photographs and videotapes of these operations has the potential of gaining public attention. Therefore, such material must be submitted to the same strict guidelines as material being considered for use in the public domain. In addition, videotape that is shot for internal use must be cleared by the U.S. attorney handling the case if it is later decided to release the tape to the public.